On Existentialism is a Humanism

Last winter I read the full transcript of Existentialism is a Humanism and I must confess I read it with different eyes this time. For whatever reason, Sartre’s philosophy on responsibility didn’t hit me or sink in last year, but it certainly is making an impression on me now.

My objection is that Sartre’s philosophy about absolute personal responsibility is over-simplistic and exclusive. Sartre posits that there are no accidents and that a person creates their passions and emotions. It seemed to me that he meant that everything that happens is my responsibility and fault. Which I resent. My absolute responsibility is not only nonfactual, but impossible.

Sartre’s example was war, in which each person who does not commit suicide or desert effectually chooses the war. That might be the case for some people, but not all people, because there are certainly people who are caught up in events in which they have no choice or discernible influence. For instance, I was not responsible for the financial crisis in 2008 (even though I did not commit suicide or leave the US, in case you were wondering). I acknowledge that it might be said that many people in power chose the crisis, via dereliction of duty or virtue or what have you. But it’s absurd to say that I personally chose the financial crisis or that or that I created a world in which such a thing could happen. Not only am I not, here and now, in any position of power, I was also not any significant player in the crisis’s precipitating events. Sartre’s absolute responsibility does not account for history (or physiology, bizarrely) in any way, which is neglecting a highly important consideration.

I don’t really understand Sartre’s reasons for rejecting physiological influence in emotion. Maybe that’s because of my times, when physiological reactions are considered matters of fact. It sounds to me like Sartre doesn’t include several important distinctions in the process of stimuli, reaction, and choice. Grant me that there are physiological reactions over which we have little control—for instance, jumping when startled. A distinct stage from that stimuli is the psychological reaction, which is probably heavily instinctual, although I would argue that that reaction can be changed with conditioning. In my example, after being startled, the psychological reaction could be the desire to flee, lash out, or gain bearings on the situation. I think it’s really important to account for yet another distinct stage in which a person chooses to react. If I was startled, I could desire to lash out but restrain myself and look around for the danger first. Or I could be startled, desire to flee, and actually take steps back. I guess the problem arises from the second case—if I desire to flee and do run away, Sartre would be mad if I said that I HAD to run because I was scared. In that way, he might say I chose to be scared. I think that’s where my problem would be—it’s inaccurate to say I chose to be sacred. It’s better to say that after being scared, I chose to act on my fear in the mode of fleeing (vs. standing my ground or gaining my bearings). It would be pretty frustrating to deal with a person who says that they aren’t responsible for their negative consequences because of their emotions. Yet I think it’s important to include room for character change and deliberation in the philosophy of responsibility. Seeing as how Sartre has a very different idea about character and human nature, I guess I hit a wall here (just to throw in a few more unaccounted situations in which absolute responsibility/choice doesn’t match: shock, being overwhelmed, making involuntary choice, and sin).

Another troublesome aspect of Sartre’s absolute responsibility is its nonsensical implications regarding abuse. To apply his reasoning, it would be to say that the victim chooses to be abused, because he or she does not commit suicide or run away. This is patently false. The responsibility and choice of abuse lies with the abuser. The victim is not creating a world in which the abuser must be abusive (it’s more likely that the abuser would be abusive no matter who is around or what is being done). To say that the victim chooses abuse is victim blaming, and I don’t care what any fancy, influential, old French man says about it—that’s wrong.

Yet, if I’m picking up on Sartre’s motivation correctly, then I can relate to his insistence on responsibility. There are cases in which people play stupid and pretend that they don’t believe in what they’re doing, and it sucks. Yesterday I was confronted with the obligation to be compassionate towards someone who wronged me, supposedly because she was incapacitated. I was completely unwilling to let her off the responsibility of her actions, for any reason more or less. I wanted to hold her to her status as a human being with rational faculties who is capable of making choices and is responsible for them (as an adult no less! With education and resources and experience, how can she not be responsible??). Unfortunately, regardless of my unwillingness, I still do accept my obligation to be compassionate to her. Thus my objection to Sartre applies to two levels—other people and me. Even though I want her to be held accountable, I recognize that there are actually extenuating circumstances in this case that mitigate her responsibility. And even though I want to be justified in hating her because of what she’s done to me, I recognize that my hurt wouldn’t validate my hate, which is a case of a person choosing as they will not.